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LAOS AND AMERICA-A

RETROSPECTIVE VIEW

Reprinted from The South Atlantic Quarterly
Yol, LXIII, f40. 2, Spring, 1964

Laos and AmericaA Retrospective View
Barbara and Joel Halpern

i

The farmers in a certain section of the U.S. seemed implicitly to
divide human beings into three categories: scenery, machinery, and
people. In the first category they grouped Indians on the nearby
reservation, who could be seen on a Sunday drive and from whom
souvenirs could be bought. In the second category were migrant
farm laborers who had to be maintained-fed, housed, and supervised. In the people category they placed neighbors, relatives, and
friends with whom they socidized and went to church, and with
whose children theirs went to school.
The peoples of Laos have been viewed by the Western world
mostly as enchanting scenery and, more recently, as rather poor
machinery. The French were early smitten with the human scenery,
and in a travel account published in 1868 Henri Mouhot depicted
the Lao as q ~ ~ esubmissive,
t,
patient, temperate, trusting, credulous,
superstitious, faithful, simple, and naYve. Needless to say, he declared the women beautiful. Auguste Pavie, the man most responsible for French colonization of Laos, found the capital of the Kingdom of Luang Frabang s delightful place in which to make his
borne for several years. Until the end of the French coIonial period
Laos continued to be regarded as a kind of Shangri-la remote from
the problems of the world, In. recent years journalists covering
politicaI crises have succumbed perhaps less to the charm than to
the stereotype and have described the Lao as irresponsible and
carefree. Human beings as ill-fuhctioning machinery began to enter
the picture during the 1960-1961 civil war. This was particularIy
true when the poor showing of the Royal Lao Army was attributed
to their Buddhist faith or inclination to be carefree.
MRS. HALPERN,a lecturer, and MR. HALPERN,
u~mciateprofemor of anthropology
at Brandeis University, were field represenintives for the foreign oid program in
northern Lnos in 1957. T h e latter revisited Laos in I959 08 consuitant to the
RAND Corporation.
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When Americans have thought about Lms it has been in terms
of scenery or possibly machinery but not in terns of people, a
classificationwhich seems to require a faiily long period of recipmcal contact. The reifying of the social scientist is similar to the
machine category, while photographs emphasize tbe scenery aspect.
To know a particular person as an individual inhibits the scenery
concept and makes more dficuIt the use of mechanical categories
of classiiication. Around Luang Prabmg, Meo tribesmen, with their
red pompom-trimmed caps, heavy silver neck-rings, short indigo
jackets, and bare torsos above flaring britches are superb subjects
for photography, but after they began to visit our home and we
learned to know them as individuals concerned with the education
of their children a d the marketing of their crops, they became
individuals rather than curiosities. Witnessing a Lao administrator's
grief at the death of his k s t child made it impossible to view him
simply as a member of the rising elite who combined the desire to
modernize his country with a continuing belief in the power of
animistic spirits.
Scenery, both physical and hum=, abounds in Laos. Most
captivating is that of the royal capital, which appears to incarnate
much of traditional Lao society that has largely vanished in Vientiane and elsewhere. Approaching Luaag Prabang from afar, by
plane, road, w river, the most striking sight is the flashing gold
spire of the Phou Si, a Buddhist shrine on top of the conical peak
rising from the center of the peniasda that forms tbe town. One
glimpses the RoyaI PaIace through a screen of frangipani and flametree blossoms. The airborne visitor gains a full view of the royal
city nestled on a finger of land at the confluence of the broad
Mekong and the clearer waters of the Nam Khan, the embankments fringes with feathery bamboo groves and the valley rimmed
by undulating blue-green mountah. Scarcely minutes away by
air are scattered tribal villages on the mountain tops and slopes,
amid scars of burned-over forest patches, and following the rivers,
more Lao villages and rice fields tucked into pocket valleys. This
is Laos in miniature, the town strings out along the river, with its
sovereign, temples, and trade, the mountains and valleys beyond
sheltering the peasants and tribesmen who form the majority of
her people.
Luang Psabang can overwhelm the senses, There are the peri-
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odic boom and tinkle of temple drums; the scent of joss sticks, jasmine, and open sewage; the sight of pagodas, each with its own
community of monks. Some of the graceful temples are shabby, and
their frescoes of b r d Buddha's incarnations are not among Asia's
finest. StiI1, the eye is dazzled by sweeping roofs surmounted by
Nagas, by the red and gold faqades set with chips of blue glass
mosaic, by the saffron robes of the bonzes spread to dry on blooming rose bushes in the temple courtyard, guarded by grimacing
plaster lions and lichen-covered stone pillars.
At the time of fithe Lao New Year the pageantry is magnificent,
the more so for being on so small a scale. There are parades of the
half-dozen royal elephants, processions of monks led by the abbots
borne on gilded paIaquins, and the appearance of the king, in his
cream-colored silk sampot, under the white parasol, symboI of the
kingdom, followed by high officials in jewel-hued garments and
accompanied by retainers waving ceremonial fans and by swordbearers and drum-beaters in scarlet uniforms. All this harks to a
fast-disappearing past. The Western-style royal band in its natty,
oversize uniforms, with kepi military hats slipping low over Lao
ears, bespeaks an ill-fitting present.
Remains of serrated potsherds and implements in the river bank
near the Palace testify to thousands of years of history. The royal
family's finely incised gold betel services recall a regal world of
half a millennium ago. Today's kerosene tins for hauling water
from the river and dugout canoes powered by outboard motors are
not new as change, but they are new as universals. Rice cultivation,
Buddhism, and the divine right of kings as cuItural elements and
complexes spread over large portions of the globe, but they never
attained the universality of the internd combusion engine or paper
currency.
A new Laotian synthesis is evolving on the old one of Indian,
Chinese, and aboriginal influences, It is not a question of mechanicd intermksing of parliamentary forms, communist ideology, constitutional monarchy, Buddhism, animism, irrigated rice culture,
barter trade, handicrafts, and international politics, but of reshaping,
redefining and shifting emphases. I n a s t i l l fluid social and political
situation, predictions for the future are risky, but a number of assumptions seem fairly safe. The United States' effort in Laos has
been a failure. The question remains whether the failure is absoIute

.
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or partial. Unlike in many other countries such as Nationalist China,
to cite the classic case, there has never been any real effortto create
a positive public image either of Laos or the American program
there. The sole efforts in this direction have been press releases of
the State Department and the foreip aid program, the chief function of which appears to have been their use as straw men for journalists and Congressional critics of the aid program. T h e stories
of corruption of the elite and basic failure of rural development
programs, as well as the inability and lack of aggressiveness of the
Roy a1 A m y , are familiar. But there are a number of matters relating
to our failure in Laos as well as to possible lessons to 'be learned
from this experience which have scarcely been mentioned in print.
The American role in Laos has been a very brief one, having
begun after the Geneva Conference in 1954. American cultural
impact on Laos has been superficial in the cultural sense but very
great in the economic sense. I n all phases of life, the American
presence in the form of diplomatic functions, economic and military
aid programs, and information activities has collided head-on with
stronsty entrenched French influence in these fields, in the cultural
characteristics of the Lao d i t e themselves, aJl of whom received
a French-sponsored education, and in the continuing physical presence of French advisors in almost a11 important government ministries, particularly during the late 1950's.
Up to 1959, official American foreign policy entertained some
hope of building up Laos as an anti-Communist buffer under the
protective umbrella of SEATO, although no one ever seriously
considered it a defense bastion. But by the time' of the Geneva
Peace Conference in May, 1961, the United States, faced with a
de fact0 Pathet Lao victory in much of the country, was advocating
a neutraI Laos.
Certain features have consistently characterized American
policy in Laos, patticularly as it pertained to economic assistance.
Despite much talk about technicd aid and a large number of
projects in this field, the program had been primarily d i t a r y untiI
the failure of the Royal Lao troops in the field. Secondary emphasis
was placed on the police and third on transportation projects. By
comparison, the s u m s spent on education, health, agriculture, and
community development were small. Even when significant mraI
aid projects have been undertaken, these have been directed by the
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army. ' I l e main part of these efforts has consistently reflected the
machinery aspects of human relations, and the spectacular failure
of this program is too well known to need documentation here.
More significant in retrospect is to understand why they were undertaken in the h t place. BasicalIy, they seem to represent a me&&
cal approach to complex s w i d phenomena or, in times of crises, to
rely on some of the tactics that were successful in winning World
War 11. Certainly the military aid program to Laos bears resemblance to its general ideological if not lineal ancestor, the
lend-lease program of World War TI. AIso important: were the
assumed virtues of a consumer economy. However, when these
concepts are removed from our own history and cuIture and applied
not to a war in Europe, or to a hishly industrialized economy which
also places great vdne on work and achievement, but transferred
to a predominaatIy subsistence and barter trade economy with
Buddhist and snimist religious systems, quite different results are
achieved.
The use of Mercedes Bern automobiles by almost all highranking oficials can be cited as an example of the corruption of
the elite. This takes on special meaning for Laos if the Mercedes is
contrasted with an d e ~ h a n t ,the former having become the prerogative of the contem^porary elite and the latter being the naditiond one. A royal prince or high official riding on an elephant
does net arouse envy or scorn. The elephant is the beloved symbol
of the kingdom, inte~atedritually into the life of the country. A
parade of painted and garlanded elephants is a source of pleasure
to dl, while a Mercedes Benz can be a pleasure only to an individual
and his family. EIephants move with digity and, say the Lao, with
grace. To tell a Lao young woman she walks Iike an elephant is a
compliment, but "classy chassis" or its equivalent has no meaning
in Lao culture. Riding slowly by atop an elephant, the individual
has a chance to see and to be seen by the populace; dfivinp past
in a car he kicks up dust in people's faces. Elephants are secured
through the hunt, and protection of the spirits is sought. Metcedes
have been obtained through currency manipnIations, or at best
account juggling, and are the indirect largess of a foreign power.
But what member of the present-day elite would prefer an clep&ant
to an automobile? Cars were first introduced into Laos by the
French and were the privilege of the highest colonial officials and
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of the king. Therefore, although far from sacred, Imury automobiles have become a new status symbol, one that connotes not power
but wealth and, more importantly, unearned and unsanctified
wealth.
American policy in Laos may be characterized as simultaneously
anticolonialist and anti-Communist in ideology, mechanical in planning, expedient in implementation and at the same time colonialist
in method. Our awn revolutionary tradition undoubtedly influenced
the American government to take an idealized view of the Laotian
state just emerging from coIonia3isrn. How else to explain America's
initial distrust of and disgust with the French? Had the American
diplomats and economic assistance persome1 been willing to humble
themselves, ask French advice, and consider continuing certain
French policies, it is possible that the pride of our Gallic friends
might not have been so greatly wounded and that, if not stively
helping lhe American effort, they at least would not have tried to
undermine it. But evidently the State Department representatives
saw only a discredited colonial power. While there were undoubtedly
some Lao elite who had grudges against the French, many of them,
who considered themselves "chiidren of the French peace (unlike
the Vietnamese, who, if one follows out the analogy, considered
themseIves bastards of French coIonialisrn)," might have willingly
co-operated with such a policy. Instead, unlike the more realistic
North Vietnamese who molded the Pathet Lao ta their own ends,
and the French who were now bereft of their power and so, also,
of many of their illusions, the Americans engendered French hostility and then permitted many of the astute Lao elite to play them
of£against the French and also the Pathet Lao as an implied threat.
Unfortunately too many of the elite were clever only hm the
point of view of amassing their own fortunes and not for building
up their government. T h e American government permitted itself
to be blackmaiIed by a series of Lao governments which were completely dependent on our aid program.
The Americans desired above all a viable Lao army, so the Lao
politicians were able to dangle the loyalty of ibis army and its concept of anti-Communism over the heads of the Americans whenever
the latter suggested currency reforms or other innovations. It might:
be thought that in a heoretical sense two anti-types of ideologies
might coalesce into a single positive program, but as it worked
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out they tended to nullify each other. When the anticolonialist
ideology suggested reform, more often than not the anti-Cornmunist ideology triumphed, the implication ironically being that
refo m s might lead to instability, possibIy anarchy, and conceivably
a Communist alternative, while stability-that is, support of the
status gu-implied
superficial anti-Communism, e.g., good traditional Buddhists cannot become Communists.
SimuItaneousIy, a mechanically pIanned aid program of salaries
in kip with dollar-hanced imports to absorb the kip generated by
salary payments resulted in undermining not only Buddhism but
what was left of the traditional elite power structure as well. It is
painfully evident that the institution of an expanding military and
economic aid program propssivel y decreased whatever felt independence of action the elite may have had. In fact they became
vassals of the Americans, 'but in public theory at least the Americans believed in anticolonialism, and hence the myth of Lao independence. Certain segments of the Lao elite, with a potential
anarchy transmutable to Communism conceivably at band, were
able effectively to manipulate the AmericansVears. Both parties
became involved in progressive self and mutuaI deception, albeit
of diEerent kinds. The Americans, while often covertly dissatisfied
with the composition of various Lao governments, felt that there was
little tbey could do within the ideological limits they had set themselves.
Part of the mechanical planning rested on this anticolonialist
myth of Lao independence; thus the whole of the aid mission was
there at the request, and the programs being undertaken on the
initiative, of the Lao government. Not too much attention was
paid, however, to the conficting anticoIonialist and anti-Communist
ideologies in program implementation. These were the underlying
impIicit assumptions which were not often questioned, least of all
by the people on the scene, especially those in the military and aid
program. Transferring implicit concepts from American domestic
life and from the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe strained
most energies in Washington and Laos. Things were brought ia a
pipeline to Laos in great numbers: army uniforms, rifles, smaIl
arms, trucks, jeeps, buEldozers, a power plant, tugs, galvanized
roofing, and some medicines, among many other items. To keep
things moving in a pipeline takes much effort. Papers must be
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filled out and transmitted, and taxpayers' dollars must be justifid
to a reluctant Congress, which in past years has always been more
amenable to military aid w a short basis than economic and technical aid over a longer period. In times of stress the capacity of the
pipeline was increased: in 1959 and 1960 the American public was
told that the crises in Laos were being met by stepping up arms
shipments. These shipments had been sufficient in the past, during
the Indochina War, to supply not only the French forces but,
though-capture, the Vietminh as well, sq that in a number of actions
in Laos both sides were reported to be using American equipment.
This is not to say that equipment and salaries are not important to
a . army in waging war, but that more vital is a will ta fight. To
conceal this failure in approach it has been necessary to invent
another myth about passive, Buddhist Lao who are not interest&
i
n fighting. This is a proposition that bears n6 relationship to the
turbulent history of the area. At the same time, concepts of people
as scenery have made selfaeception easier.
This kind of planning has been evident in technical assistance
programs as well, where funds must be committed for the present
year and programmed for the next. The culmination of this process
is the r i t u a l exchange of smiIes and handshakes for goods, ephemerally memoridized in news photographs and propaganda posters.
Should the Communists consoLidate their victories and American
infIuence be eliminated from Laos, there will have been endless
official smiles .to cover the grave of Iost American hopes. The most
"materialistic" peopIe on earth will have traded a small portion of
our treasures for an evanescent anti-Communist stdux quo maintained through a few brief years. When Americans feel threatened
they emphasize action and sped. Crash programs were set up, with
hurried plans and symbolic results. In Laos the peasant was rediscovered, and m a 1 development, "Civic Action," on a crash basis
was rewarded by houses built but not h d in, movies shown but
not understood, propaganda publications distributed to cover cracks
on bamboo walls, prize chickens eaten but not bred, roads built
but not maintained. Again the "materialists" were temporarily
satisfied with fleeting symbolic acts.
This type of planning and action requires no knowledge beyond
an implicit faith in one's own culture and its stereotyped view of
another. For the believer in the ever constant jeep and airplane and
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in the imperative to adopt variabIe nature to their needs, surveys
of reads and airfield sites are necessary. Passive Buddhism and
colorful, traditional, hungry, sick, illiterate rural people can be
assumed to be forever constant if an idealistic view of the world is
to be perpetuated. But jeeps do change socia1 structures, education
experts do affect religious vaIue systems, and exchange mtes do
affect concepts of the future. In some cases even hindsight may be
covered up with another myth to replace the one destroyed: Ratter
the Communists by attributing to their influence all unexpected
changes.
It is possible to be colonialist in methodology and anticolonialist
in ideology. Recognition of the concept of a free and independent
Laos with a vision of its economic progress and institutional stability does not define how one shall live and work to bring this
about. If speed, action, and recruitment are important, then c o b
nialist methodology becomes imperative. If salary and living conditions are aqsumed to be major motivations, the recruitment to Little
America becomes axiomatic. Little America provided housing
segregated from that of the host country, frozen foods in a commissary, and exclusive community facilities. Action required those
who, unlike almost all Lao of the mid-fifties, were familiar with the
Fnplish language and American techniques. Just as the French used
Vietnamese in Laos, so the Americans have had Chinese from Hong
Kong as servants and en,@neers, FiIipinos as architects and accountants, Thai from Bangkok as interpreters and warehousemen.
Have we learned in this small and in many ways marfinal
country anything which might be applicable elsewhere? Given the
geographic relation of Laos to neighboring China and North Vietnam, was it possible for Laos to remain independent even with
an enIightened American prosam if the steadfast intention of China
md Vietnam was to subvert her? While defmitive answers to these
questions are not possible, we can envisage courses of action alternative to those that have been pursued, Possibly these might be helpful
in planning programs in those countries which, in terms of ethnic
diversity, economic underdevelopment, reliance on traditional
power structures and on external assistance, share many features
that have characterized Laos. A primary need is to conceptualize
the future clearly. What type of government and social system do
the local elite foresee a year, five years, or a decade or more hence?
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To what extent do these aspirations accord with American aims
and objectives? Is it possible to harmonize the two? A major problem obstructing the solution of issues of this nature was that faced
by the American movernment in Laos, namely a traditional and
P
basically conservative elite who opposed an active Communist organization. Should the United States support reform groups, as was
covertly attempted in the case of a young eIite reform group in
Laos? It is possible that one of the factors contributing to failure
was the lack of consistent and co-ordinated programs, particuIarly
with regard to rural areas and minority problems. There was at
Ieast a fair chance that if long-range planning in these fields had
begun in 1955 and 1956 some basis for resisting Pathet Lao infiltration in the countryside might have been established. Much of
the talk in the United States has revolved around the amount of
fore@ aid, and there is ample indication that in the Laos case,
especiauy in the rniIitary fieId, too much money was spent too
heedlessly.
Part of the difficulty in an entrenched elite and the lack of
alternatives is related to the matter of trained personnel. Sporadic
attempts were made to train a few Lao in various fields, in the
United States and also to send others to Thailand and the Philippines for special study. The major fault with these programs was
that too few were chosen and that they were sent for too short a time.
Further, most of them were the sons or relatives of the elite. Had
1,000 students selected from the elite and at least an equal number
from villages and tribal areas been sent for one, two, three, and
four year courses of study, by 1960 there could have been a few
hundred college graduates in engineering, education, agriculture,
and medicine. The cost would have been at most a few miIlion
dollars a year, a fraction of the cost of military supplies (many of
which decayed or rusted and were never used). Flexibility and
knowledge are cIosely linked ta long-ranp planning. One of the
best ways of embarking on a long-range development program is
to profit from the knowledge and institutions created by the former
colonial power. (There is a danger in associating policy too closeIy
with that of a former colonial power, but there is also the opposite
hazard which occurred, at least initially, in Laos.)
Although various topographic surveys were undertaken in Laos,
American officials consistently Iacked any basic howledge of mral
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economies, tribal organizations, or even urban development. It is
t r u e that in theory it might be nice to depend on the local government for this information, but with Laos's lack of trained personnel
much of this information was often unavailable to local authorities.
B d g , tax, transportation, and geological consultants were employed by American agencies, but aside from a few supeficial
surveys at no time were any anthrop~ogists,linguists, sociologists,
human geographers, agricultural economists, or political scientists
employmi, much less consulted. American ofliciaIs during their
tenure in Laos in the 1950's were never precisely aware of the
cultures of the tribal peoples, the Ianguages they spoke, the roIe
of the Buddhist pagoda in Lao village life or, for that matter, the
traditional value system of the Lao. Nor were the responsible
American officials during this critical period particularly interested
in seeking any of this kind of information.
Knowledge alone will not insure success, no more than an
understanding of Mao Tse Tung's tactics of guerrilla warfare based
in ruraI areas prevented a repetition of the same developments in
Vietnam and Laos. Intelligently trained diplomatic personnel with
knowIedge of the local lanpage (Lao, not French) and a backmround in tl1e history, customs, and traditions of the a,rea are essen5
ha1 and will also help not onIy in securing information but in
insuring its best utilization. This situation is changing, but even
good, dedicated personnel are no substitute for leadership and a
clearly conceived future program of action.
With regard to positive external policies, regional federations
of local nations can also be very important, as can concerted programs of economic and technical assistance through the United
Nations. As far as Laos is concerned, one of the most hopeful
developments, although perhaps too late, has been the Mekong
Development Plan, undertaken under the auspices of the United
Nations, in which Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam
share in a common program of d&elopment based on the Mekon:
basin. Furthering bonds with Thailand was a positive and significant
policy of the American government in Laos, but, unfortunately,
this policy never had time to bear fruit.
Without doubt many of these points are not practical in the
sense that they actually could have been accomplished in Lao? or
can be easily accomplished in other areas. But faiIure is also im-
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practical, in an even broader sense. It does not require great clairvoyance to predict that what happened in Laos will also occur,
with local variations, in other countries unless the future is clearly
conceived by American policy-makers and attempts are made to
implement these conceptions either with existing governments or
the emerging governments. Positive and dynamic ideologies must
be evolved from living syntheses of local traditions and democratic
Western politicd inheritances. Communist programs for development as evolved in North Vietnam and eIsewhere are not inevitable
since they depend on coercion, but: an imaginatively conceived
future is an indispensable prerequisite for effective counterpolicy.
The Americans and their Lao associates succeeded in destroying
the traditional bases for effectiverule without any positive replacement. As long as such policies are continued the triumph of Communist-sponsored movements is indeed inevitable.
It is considered unfashionable to mourn the passing of the noble
savage or the romantic past, a past which was pleasanter than the
future in prospect. In Laos one can say that the greatest causes for
change have been external. WMe military intrusions are not new
in Lao history, French colonialism, followed by American presence
in the economic and political senses, are characterjstic developments
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as are, obviousIy, the
motivating Communist philosophies of Laas' two northern neighbors. Neither the Lao not the tribal peoples were much bothered by
problems of land reform or famine, and although there have been
social frictions these have been basically resolvable since Laos is
an underpopulated country; so pressures for rapid social change
cannot be considered internal. But even the external pressures are
symptoms rather than basic causes: it is really the social imperatives
arising from the worldwide diffusion of an industrial civilization
that are causing vast changes in Laotian cultural patterns. Regardless of the outcome of the present politico-military struggIe, many
of the unique features of Lao civilization wilI disappear because
shey are no longer functional. We have museums for adfacts but
none for traditions and value systems. Change is not new, but the
progressive disappearance of unique ways of life is. WhiIe worldwide cultural uniformity does net appear imminent, the progressive elimination of small civiliza~onseven though temporarily
conceived of as modem independent national entities appears a
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growing trend. Lao music, crafts, religiaus holidays, life crises rites,
folk tales, and even behavior patterns and value systems will aU be
partially or completeIy obliterated in the not too distant future,
and there is surely some cause for regret, aside from the purely
sentimental.
It is conceivable that greater understanding of cultusat. processes
in the future may enable us to plan how minor as well as major
civihzations may be modified and certain desirable elements p r e
served by means of social engineering, hopefully democratiE in
nature. We are not inevitable absoIute slaves of the culture process,
in Laos or elsewherethe Pathet Lao and their backers have done
well in Laos not because of the inevitability of the acceptance of
their ideology but because their concept of the future has not been
eflectively md cornprchensively challenged. If we have learned
anything of the cultusd process or the evolution of civilizations it is
that they change as wholes, not as parts. It is not possible to try to
hold the religious and social sectors constant and innovate sporadically in the economic and military. Herein Iies the basic cause of
the failure of the West in Laos. The continued use of conventional
diplomacy and economics will, of necessity, result in future failures
for the West. Time is on the side of those who broadly conceptunlize
change. In Laos the Pathet Lao and their backers have pre-emptd
the field by defanIt.

